Sunday, May 5, 2013

The Medium of Contingency & Soft Dogma


From the upcoming AU discussion -- with enhancements regarding openness (which, per Negarastani, domesticates -- it's merely a form of soft dogma!?) vs. closure (which turns itself into a good meal). 

  "Why has the concept of contingency taken on a marked importance both in contemporary philosophy and in contemporary art practice? And if this simultaneity derives from parallel problems met with in the two different fields, what are their common roots?

  At its simplest 'contingency' refers to the attempt to think events that take place but need not take place: events that could be, or could have been, otherwise. Why does such an apparently simple concept lead us into a rich new vein of speculative thought?"  (R Mackay)

The Medium of Contingency was published by Urbanomic in 2011 around an art exhibition and discussion that occurred at the Thomas Dane Gallery in London. The exhibition was organized by Miguel Abreu Gallery and Urbanomic.

TMC includes four short talks and a discussion that engages political economics, philosophy and artistic production.  Video here.
 
____

I find Negarestani's notion of closure particularly provocative. Emphasis added below.

Complicity exhibits this necessary shift from the inhibitive role of commonalities to the role of closure as a focused engagement with contingency, its intrusions, twists and suspensions. Whilst openness domesticates the thought of contingency through affordable states of interaction, commonalities and other forms of soft dogma, closure, on the other hand, turns itself into a 'good meal' or a 'genuine prey' for the real expression of contingency and its unrestricted play: the more closed a work, the more radically it is subjected to the interventions of its contingent materials, the wider it is broadened and butchered opened to the outside. Therefore, we can say that closure realises openness in its radical sense: not as openness toward the possibility of contingencies from the outside, but as a 'being opened' by the contingent materials that form the work. This is why complicity is a twisted form of embracing contingency, because it has an inverse mechanism: through closure, complicity seeks to twist the soft dogma of 'openness toward contingent materials' into a 'being-opened by contingent materials'.
...
Complicity reformulates the rigorous closure of the work as a narrative plot where contingent events unfold, where unpredictable twists take shape and where the work becomes the subject of experimentation of its own materials. It is essential for the artist to see the artistic production as a conspiracy of contingent influences; as the work proceeds toward completion and coherency, the plot thickens. In this conspiracy, the plot twist is that so-called 'creative openness' turns out to have been a distraction all along: the closure of the work is the only way to participate with and uncover the conspiracy of contingent materials, by luring the forces of contingency to play their weirdest games, and in doing so, to reveal themselves. To this end, when it comes to the thought of contingency, the artist must recognise herself as the conspiracy theorist of her materials. But we must first realise that the work of contingency is neither horrific nor suspenseful; it is subtly twisted. In thinking the conspiracy of contingent materials, one can think of a continuum where everyday superficiality, horror, reason, comedy, suspense and seamless uneventfulness are all fuzzy gradients of the same contingent universe that might be brought in and out of focus without respect to any necessity whatsoever.

____
Introduction by Robin Mackay. Reza Negarestani: Contingency and Complicity.  Elie Ayache: In the Middle of the Event.  Matthew Poole: Art, Human Capital & The Medium of Contingency.

MORE Selected text from Robin Mackay's introduction:

"...contingency cannot be thought through neo-romantic concepts of openness, chance, and process: it demands instead a special sort of discipline. As Reza Negarestani argues ...this practice must dissolve certain cliches that have crystallised around the artistic engagement with contingency.  We always risk relapsing onto models that fail before contingency: models that return us to the metaphysics of chance and calculation; or which re-affirm the privilege of meaning-making over material contingencies. Negarestani... asks what sort of rigorous conceptual preparation is necessary in order to make one's work - or oneself - a 'good meal' for these anonymous [contingent] materials.

"Ayache argues that we must rethink our image of the market by understanding that, in practice, traders do not calculate price on the basis of probabilistic tools, but directly and effectively wnte price as the contingent reality of the market, now. The market is therefore not a set of probabilities, but the very medium of contingency.  ... Its events are effective without prevision or reason."

Ayache compares the act of writing options contracts with literary creation, as a material inscription of difference directly in the real, creating a future that is in principle unforeseeable.

These [artistic] works [can be] written in the hope and knowledge that the interaction of their anticipations will create in the now the reality of an exchange of art and thought. They can thus be considered, in Ayache's words, 'technologies of the future [ ... ] but only insofar as we wish that the difference they will make in the future may make a difference today'.

... Ayache's characterization of the market as the site of radical contingency will also be read alongside another claim: that contemporary art's coming to terms with its own implication in various forms of exchange can be read as a synecdoche for fundamental sociopolitical changes wrought by neo-liberal capitalism.  It is within this process of adjustment that Matthew Poole's work locates the figure of the curator.

Liberal economics enabled us, as an article of faith, to distinguish between our inalienable, sovereign self, and our 'labour capital', that part of ourselves exposed to the contingencies of the market, to trading and speculation. In neo-liberal capital, the distinction is being eroded, as the changing nature of work sees the performance of the self entirely integrated into Capitalist production - the notion of 'human capital', the monetization of social networks, the obligation to 'curate' and present the self, and the 'experience economy'. Submitted to exchange value, human 'assets' have now become subject to speculation and trading, so that the once sovereign values of self, experience and memory become subject to the contingencies of the market."

Sunday, April 21, 2013

Dale Yarger's Differend


    -from an old notebook of Dale's, probably early 70s



I don’t believe in Buddha
I don’t believe in Jesus
I don’t believe in freedom
I don’t believe in lies
I believe in electricity
I believe in fear
I believe in death
I believe in falsehood
I believe in ambiguity
I believe in chance
I don’t believe in nature
I don’t believe in cities
I don’t believe in love
I believe in dancing
I don’t believe in work
I believe in games
I don’t believe in myself
I don’t believe in fiction
I don’t believe in life
I don’t believe in truth
I don’t believe in poetry
I don’t believe in art
I don’t believe in sin
I don’t believe in purity
I don’t believe in sport
I don’t believe in action
I don’t believe in fun
I don’t believe in success
I don’t believe in fame
I believe in a greater intelligence than myself
I don’t believe in sympathy
I don’t believe in health
I don’t like food but
I like Coca-Cola
I don’t like drugs but
I like to smoke
I don’t believe in tobacco
I don’t believe in ethics
I don’t believe in justice
I don’t believe in god
I don’t believe in the violent
I don’t believe in worship
I don’t believe in beauty
I don’t’ believe in fate
I don’t believe in science
I don’t believe in logic
I don’t put much faith in illogic
I don’t take to dogma
I don’t deny reactionaries
I don’t like to think
I don’t like to solve problems
I have never made anything worthwhile
I have never denied my hope
I have never tried to commit suicide
I have never made myself laugh
I always end up close to where I began
I get confused often
I feel like homemade shit
I can’t always laugh
I can’t always desecrate
I can’t always escape
I can’t always win
I can’t always lose
I can’t always see straight
I can’t always concentrate
I can count on sleep
I can count on dreams
I can count on disease
I like being sick.

Friday, March 22, 2013

Blind Carbon

“The burning space between one letter and the next...” -Jabes
 
Opposing thumbs
not the facts
a feeling of if
a feeling of why
an interstice whose art is to work
as relations are
to the wrong facts

I mean formal dynamics
against speech
Man O War who sired 379 foils
heart attack at 30
This is where I
white out of
betweens (love
the crispy crackers)
I never vomit but
swallow chalk
to eject the defined
negative
lyric extreme

Flesh in dreams
inadequate to convict
said snoozefest
subject and object
medicated with
bifurcating hooks
Let us ghost that hammock
and spread acres of fat
a valley's loins
officer, did you take my hat?

Sunday, March 3, 2013

Ecopoetics - Alt Tracks - Toward Stengers

Track 2 – An alternate world

I want to talk about Isabelle Stengers' notion of an ecology of practices as a tool for thinking and what the implications of this might be for what poetry and poetics can become, that is, for those who write and read and listen to it.

An ecology of practices, as a tool for thinking, is performative. It attempts to address itself to practitioners of a field. “To dream along with” – “in a mode that is not critical, which [does] not remind [practitioners]… of limits inherent to their activity.”

An ecology of practices addresses how practices relate to each other (though clearly they can only partially relate). There are no practices that can be independent of environment.

Practitioners want their work to cohere. Coherence is not necessarily logical, but rather it is eco-logical. Something coheres in relation to its environment.

What poem or book of poems isn’t an attempt to cohere -- to foster its own force.

“An ecology of practices does not have any ambition to describe practices 'as they are’…. It aims at the construction of new… possibilities for them to be present or, in other words, to connect. It thus does not approach practices as they are… but as they may become.”

Stengers argues that: “… practices must not be defended as if they are weak. The problem for each practice is how to foster its own force, to make present what causes practitioners to think and feel and act.”

According to Stengers, “...tools for thinking are… the ones that address and actualize [the] power of the situation, that make it a matter of concern, in other words, make us think and not recognize.  …recognition would lead to the question-- why should we take practices seriously [e.g., poetics/poetry] as we know very well that they are in the process of being destroyed by Capitalism?  …The ecology of practices is a non-neutral tool as it entails the decisions never to accept Capitalist destruction as freeing the ground for anything but Capitalism itself.”

The challenge is to think: "par le milieu" (with the milieu) which implies becoming through the middle (without grounding definitions or an ideal horizon—in other words, unmapped) and with the surroundings. No theory gives you the power to disentangle something from its particular surroundings.

The ecology of practices as a tool for thinking must be immanent – so to the extent that it’s a critique, it’s an immanent critique. It wants to contrast rather than oppose. In fact it wants to find the stubborn facts and (ala Whitehead) to convert oppositions into contrasts.

An ecology of practices wants to affirm the positive value of attachment – which is what obligates practitioners. So it asks how it is that one belongs, and how that belonging obligates you.  Attachments are what you have and hold, &/or what has you or holds you. I think of belonging as what owns you, or what holds or infects you – at the same time that you own, or hold or infect it.

All attachments that build obligations are in some sense affiliations or involvements with other entities (not just human ones).

Obligation may be created from a practitioner’s attachment to a particular definition or concept of what poetry &/or poetics can be or become.  This is a polite way of saying that we have attachments to ‘esthetic’ style, the manner of how something is done, and/or ideology.  

Stengers says: Attachments are what cause us to think.  It’s probably not just pencil and paper, or keyboard and screen that makes us think, but also how I’m infected – with matters of concern.

 “Attachments matter and the way that they matter becomes apparent when you do not take them into account…  As Latour beautifully showed in Pandora’s Hope, attachment and autonomy rather go together. Attachments are what cause people… to feel and think, to be able or to become able.  The problem… may be that some of us… confuse attachments with universal obligations… and feel free... to judge, deconstruct or disqualify what appears to them as illusions or folkloric beliefs and claims.” (EOP, 191)

A first step in an ecology of poetic practice might be to situate the relevance and limits of poetic practice without engaging in destructive critique. In other words, where are the “borders” with other practices and what questions matter – what questions make us think rather than re-cognize?

Stengers is focused on the constructive, on becoming or how things change, rather than the destructive or the deconstructive.

“You never construct in general, [but] always in relation with … a matter of concern.”  She doesn't want to construct a general theory, she wants to make proposals to provoke thought but always within a field of practice. That is the immanent part of the critique to remain "within the very field of practices that it is seeking to change.” Thus, she won’t accept claims that separate themselves from the actual practice, the actual becoming.

Constructivism is non-foundationist. That is, truth is a construction – so there is no primacy of truth. She’s against either-or propositions. It’s not the chicken or the egg, that’s a false choice; it is not a choice between objects being prior to relations or vice versa.  As Shaviro suggests: “What’s really real can be actual entities and actual occasions—not just the former.” (Shaviro, The Actual Volcano, 284).

Stengers argues for the minor stage (or minor literature) and against the major – because the “major” always appeals to Truth (with a capital ‘T’ – which by history’s lights must lead directly to freedom, as in: “the truth will set you free”). The minor resists this traditional form of “enlightenment” – i.e., this appeal to truth.

Working from examples in the sciences, Stengers is against universalization (i.e., against any world view or model) that would deny the validity of other theories and practices outside its own practice/discipline. Universalization usually denies the validity of all other theories.

She sees innovative scientific propositions as (in part) making fiction – & if the fiction is accepted, it modifies the scientific reality – in a sense it makes history.  David Graeber says somewhere – consistent with Latour probably – that if you convince enough people that you are king of France, you are king of France.

Track 4 – Must Be Some Way Outta Here

Stengers is very much with Latour & Whitehead & the Speculative Realists against the bifurcation of the world into two realms: the human (or culture) versus nature. One way to think about this is as a denial of the distinction between how we conventionally think about subject and object. They are, in fact, hopelessly intertwined.

Regarding OOO’s emphasis on “object”, one could argue for a similarly flat subject-oriented ontology based on Whitehead’s notion that all objects are also subjects, they have a mental pole, even if it’s relatively dormant.  Here’s Shaviro again: “If ontological equality means anything, it means that all entities in the universe, without exception, are sentient or experiential. In other words, where OOO claims that everything is an object, Whitehead rather claims that everything is a subject: “apart from the experiences of subjects there is nothing, nothing, nothing, bare nothingness” (PR 167). (PT, #1086)

The notion of Ecology of Practices is in synch with Tim Morton’s definition of ecopoetics as co-existence.  In fact, Stengers’ Introductory notes on an Ecology of Practices were written in response to Brian Massumi’s proposition that “a political ecology would be a social technology of belonging, assuming coexistence and co-becoming as the habitat of practices.” [Note that I don’t believe that the term ‘social technology of belonging’ is trying to conjure some argument for Facebook.  It can perhaps be understood as an application of belonging for practical use.]

In a political context, for example, Stengers argues for co-existence with the black bloc.  Their “so-called violence is nothing compared to that of the cops.”  She says that what matters “is not to demand a unifying principle which would be stronger than the divergence, but to learn how to work together not in spite of but through the divergence.” (CP interview)

Divergent poetics can be explained by singular modes of decision. Per Shaviro: “What keeps entities distinct from one another, despite their continual interpenetration, is precisely their disparate manners, or their singular modes of decision and selection. Novelty arises, not from some pre-existing reserve, but from an act of positive decision.” (Shaviro TAV, 287)

Morton argues that: “intimacy is what we need in ecological awareness, not feeling like we're part of something bigger...”  If ecopoetics is intimate co-existence with other entities, then I assume Morton would say that such intimacy forms a new entity, or else there would have to be a feeling of being part of something bigger.

Morton emphasizes the poem as an object, an autonomous entity that forces us to coexist with it, if & when we read it.  He studiously avoids talk of the present, which he explains away via the interactions of objects.

“...To write poetry is to force the reader [emphasis added] to coexist with fragile phrases, fragile ink, fragile paper: to experience the many physical levels of a poem's architecture... sheer co-existence... This coexistence happens not in some eternal now, or in a now-point, however expansive or constrained. The 'nowness' of a poem, its spaciousness, is the disquieting asymmetry between appearance and essence, past and future.” (Morton, ODOP, 222)

For Morton, it comes down to the rift within objects, their inconsistency with themselves.  This is the only way something new appears.  He wants to define away any “nowness” through the friction between essence and appearance.  For Morton, the presence of a habitat is like a presumed nature that implies a metaphysically "present" boundary, a bifurcation which he wants to reject. “OOO is precisely against metaphysics of presence.  Boundaries called ‘present’ or ‘nature’ are always totally arbitrary and metaphysical.”  (EWN, 4-23-12)

For Stengers, I don’t think co-existence is an event that happens at a “now-point.”  It is an assumption (see Massumi’s proposition above) of what is needed (along with co-becoming) for there to be a habitat of practices.

Co-existence is about sharing an interstice with others.  For Stengers, there is no habitat without co-existence and vice versa. It isn’t clear to me that her notion of a habitat is static or metaphysically bounded.

For Morton, the past is appearance, the future is essence.  We live in the era of sticky hyperobjects (objects massively distributed in time and space, e.g., global warming).  Like Levinas’s ethical turn, there’s no going back once we look into the face of The Hyperobject.

I’m leery of Morton’s attachment to essence, and to his insistence that there is no ecology of the present, no poetics of the present, which perhaps jibes with Buddhist emptiness or nothingness.  Somewhere Stengers says that “what the poets call presence is infection.”  I think there are actual occasions, not just actual entities; there are occasions or events that happen in “our” presence, that infect actual entities of all kinds.

Track 5 – The Bridge

What does a less anthropocentric poetics look like? Is it a poetry of affinities, a celebration of the democracy of all objects, along the lines of: “Sorry, Tree.”  What would a poetry look like that would not privilege (the human realm nor) its own language?

If poetics (as Donato Mancini suggests) is criticism at the site of writing, then I want it to be immanent critique, a critique that makes us think rather than recognize, that induces us to become other than who we are.

For poets and artists, the compulsion (or goal) might be: how to produce objects or poems that cohere in their own ways – that have lives of their own.  But this isn’t what activates thinking.

Looking at disputes within contemporary poetics – formal innovation typically trumps expression (though in book sales that’s probably the obverse).

For me, the notion of a poet’s obligation implies a real tension between ethics and aesthetics. Esthetic conscience and ideology seem more relevant to ethics since they stress how complicit we necessarily are, trapped in the circuits of Capital. I want to celebrate aesthetic contact with the outside, without losing sight of how easy it is to turn theory into a conquest.  I want to be able to read and write like a loser, not just for victory.

If one takes aesthetics as “a primordial form of relation and interaction,” in effect a first philosophy, then the obligation may be to struggle – to relate and interact, that is, to connect. And not just to words – but to all objects/entities that one meets in the world.

The quandary is how to convert oppositions into contrasts, how to find, as Shaviro suggests, “an aesthetic place for ethics; an immanent place for transcendence.”

Saturday, February 16, 2013

Ecopoetics Brief on Aesthetic Decision


There is no time to be brief.  -Nancy Shaw & Catriona Strang

Before I withdraw to talk to myself about Stengers, a not-so-brief conclusion, borrowed as it may be:

I’m interested in an aesthetics of decision that takes innovation and change as primary processes rather than “adaptive reactions to environmental pressures.”  I don’t think we’re writing poetry (or at least I’m not) out of some need for self-preservation (or Spinozan conatus) or self-reproduction, in search of some homeostatic equilibrium.  That is, I’m interested less in continuity than in novelty (& I’d prefer a relevant, not blind novelty, please) – a kind of continual redefinition, “becoming other than I am.”  Perhaps as our private thoughts become public, we are arguably becoming other.

When I use “aesthetics” here I mean an affective aesthetics that is very much in synch with Tim Morton’s notion of aesthetics as causality, except I think aesthetics goes all the way down – there is no distinction between appearance and essence, no distinction between a surface sensual realm and a deep substantial one.  The truth of appearances is that there are only appearances.

Steve Shaviro relates this affective flavor of aesthetics to Kant’s description of feelings or aesthetic experience as “intuitions without concepts.” The cause of a decision can never be reduced to some human production.  Decisions are made but we’re not exactly their author.  This is aesthetics as a first philosophy – before ethics, before political economics.

In the grooves of daily habit, we travel familiar paths without consciously thinking about what we’re doing. Wittgenstein quips somewhere that you “can pretend to be unconscious; but conscious?”  But LW wasn’t thinking about the predominance of what the brain registers, that is, the mass of data that never make it to conscious thought, i.e., consciousness is the rare exception not the norm.

Here is Shaviro on Whitehead: “Decision is what makes consciousness, cognition and public relationality possible in the first place. “Feelings” or movements of “appetition” are the basic elements of mentality (or “inwardness”…). Cognition, consciousness, and responsibility are consequences of this basic mentality, rather than preconditions for it. An aesthetic of decision precedes and grounds cognition and consciousness – rather than either of these being the grounds or preconditions for any process of decision. (PT, #763)

We need to think slime molds and bacteria here – they make their own decisions, or rather decisions happen to them, just like they happen to humans.

My idea is that poetic decision is an occasion for an actual aesthetic contact with the outside.  Poetic decision occurs at the threshold between inner feeling (or “movement of appetition”) and the outside (or public) realm.  We live with the results of decisions that happen to us. Stengers suggests “decisions take place in the presence of those who will bear their consequences.”

Decision is an act of selection.  Etymologically, a decision is a cutting off, it cuts off alternate possibilities.  But you can’t account for them, decisions are beyond that.

“We don’t make decisions because we are free and responsible; rather, we are free and responsible because – and precisely to the extent that – we make decisions.” (Shaviro WC, 94)

The decisions that happen to us, like the thoughts that happen to us, may be expressions of aesthetic causality.  While I think I agree with Tim Morton that poetry tampers directly with causality, I also want to emphasize that poetic process involves decision that takes place in our presence, in the present, and this matters to us.

For Whitehead decision is the culmination of private experience, an event that punctuates a process.  It is Stengers and Whitehead’s embrace of process and relationality – which implies a present – which is incompatible with OOO.  Morton argues that “presence is an optical illusion.”  It is OOO’s emphasis on essence that is incompatible with Stengers’s thought.  Perhaps my difference with Morton is that he seems to emphasize the poem as object, at the expense of poetic process, as if there were only entities or objects, no occasions.

I want to say that poetic decision* as an aesthetic contact provides political hope, i.e., if the goal is to change (rather than to merely interpret) the world.  To believe that another world is possible is important.  It helps that there is a ready source of contact outside the circuits of Capital, outside the commodification of everything in the human world. Aesthetic decision is an event (a very plural event) that is happening all the fucking time, all over the place, uncontrollably, outside the circuits of capital.  Unfortunately while this provides hope, it won’t get us home free, since the poetic decision instantly perishes – it is lost and/or commodified, immediately subsumed in the wake of its event.

Shaviro contrasts the optimism of aesthetic contact (in the form of Hardt/Negri’s living labor and general intellect) to Adorno’s pessimism of the impossibility of avoiding subsumption:

Hardt/Negri and Lazzarato are right, as against Adorno, in asserting the ontological priority of “living labor” or “general intellect” over capital’s recuperation or appropriation of this labor and intellect. But they are willfully naive to think that this ontologically primary process is accessible without passing through the circuits of capital – the necessity of this passage… is what Adorno’s pessimism correctly apprehends, and it is also what fuels Zizek’s criticism of Hardt/Negri. (Shaviro, Pinocchio Theory blog, post #499)

The fact that we can touch the outside should be celebrated; it is the basis of collective creation, the basis of hope for resistance and change.  But after publication (which is the consequence of decision, the culmination of private experience), these creations cannot be accessed outside the circuits of capital, where everything is subsumed and complicitous.

I can relate this antinomy or paradox to Stengers and Shaviro more easily than I can to Morton and Harman.  The point is to have contact with the outside as much as possible and to try to negotiate the political economic circuits as best we can, possibly by following Leibniz dictum 'dic cur hic' – to say why you chose to say this, or to do that, on this precise occasion.  It is to pay attention as best you can to who & where you are. To pay attention to the decisions that are happening to you, e.g., as you write.

Stengers’ difference with OOO is perhaps demonstrated by her insistence (viz Capitalist Sorcery especially) that we must resist all mobilization, all denunciation, and the temptation to turn a theory into a conquest. Force and/or weakness comes before truth and/or justice. Don't look into the distance. The metaphor Stengers uses is that: the job is to sound the depths – as if on a boat calling out the dangers that lurk below the surface.

But for OOO, it is impossible to sound the deepest depths of an object, the emphasis is on the primacy of how objects withdraw from access.

Stengers emphasizes that ‘another world is possible,’ Morton wants the notion of ecology without nature to infect us, to force us to live in the world more ethically.  Both find the current world intolerable.

One question for OOO might be to ask whether it is resisting mobilization - or disentangling itself from notions of ‘progress.’ Morton makes brilliant arguments, and is trying to make the most persuasive case, to make an OOO ecopoetic light come on for us.  Stengers on the other hand is doing immanent critique, trying to dream with us poet practitioners.

___________
*Note that I hope this notion of aesthetic decision is distinct from Laruelle’s notion of philosophical decision as some primordial or transhistorical syntax or structure underlying philosophical practice.  Syntax and structure can’t really precondition or apply to (aesthetic) intuitions without concepts.  Laruelle is claiming non-philosophy, or its syntax, is outside, or hierarchically above.  But I think aesthetics-all-the-way-down as a proposition is only claiming a contact with an outside.


Saturday, December 15, 2012

Namedrops Keep Fallin On My Head


-the boobirds have come to eat me, it won't be long now



Daily paintings
There is gonna be a stabbing
in plein air
Lady Gaga's boyfriend
on an orange trike
Ozzy Osbourne's tv agent
Be gentle from now on
Charles Saatchi was supposed to come
I couldn't get there after the bombing
Maria Carey
Indiscriminate love
A videotape of how it really happened
Birth control
A fashion show
I love Marilyn Manson and everything
Angels on his balls
Anything you want
Friend who used to punch his horse
There are ways to do this psychologically
I cling to too much to be able to do this
I am inherited, a ghost
We are all disabled
I'm not saying shit
Dennis Hopper said it was a glazed donut
I guarded this other Hopper at the Walker Art Center
Arnold Schwarzenegger stayed at this hotel
And someone else it wasn't George Bush at the Sturgis Hilton
When you see your dog melting don't jump in
I'm done worrying about shit
The name of my show in LA
Keeping money from me
Paintallica my collective or occulted Venus
Someday you'll wake up and everything will be easy again
Staying at the hotel where Graham Parsons died
Scratched my eye stuck in Joshua Tree
You are full of magic
Wrestling with scorpions
Abducted on Oxycontin
Two little Mormon girls lost in the desert
Sun dancer with the black feet
Welcome to dumbdumb land
Yoko Ono, Richard Flood, all star cast
Hunter Thompson and the Hells Angels
Kanye West, Kim Kardasian
Larry Clark, New York gas stations
David Lynch, David Byrne
Chris Farley knocked on my door
the day he died
Perspective from the shining
Brain plague torn memories
Lost memories ancient history
Tattoo on my arm from shoot in GQ magazine
Obama, there's 50 cent
Black hole in the center
My large telescope
Goofball truth syrup
Charges against you
Sid Vicious family reunion
You have gifts
Albert fuckin Einstein
All the film crews at my house
Wrote that last year
Jonathan Borofsky's roommate at Yale
Tattooed on his ass
Barneys New York stayed up
And chainsawed all night
Pablo Picasso's granddaughter
Carhart all day modeling
Partied with David Blaine



















[as thumbed 6/28/2012 at western bridge]

Saturday, December 1, 2012

Notes from Jeffrey & Claudia


Drawing in space
Back door to picket fence
Used the clear then the gel
Survived a ten year moratorium on goth

Made a skull of myself
Felt the figment
skin played out over 7 floors
in a world of light
footcandles of bulbs and wonder
Friendship like a river
parenthetical
timing proportion to
celebration
cinema and standup

(The Maldives)

Let's make the box less black
Complete the gesture
how assessment of craft
her fear of flying
carries me

A coffin is placed in the household
portrait hung in its place
wooden shoes for water walking

Two slices, unexpected pleasure
in a wooden box
sandwich with too much bread
what is stacked first
I plied the trade
and overpaid

Life about art and death
Art about life and death
Death about life and art
Dreams about a lost word
lost words and love

"Step away from the car"
or symmetry will kill
homoerotic fashion
I'll show you
how plywood reeks

He proved
childhood never stops
timed to sing
to say it
say it
just sing


[from notes taken 11/8/2012 at henry gallery]