Suffering as self-enjoyment - Kolozova

Enjoyment and suffering no longer establish opposition. They are both instances of the lived, of the sheer experience that takes place as “suffering,” in the etymological sense of the Latin word passio.
One is subjected to a sensation, be it pleasure or pain, which takes place in the defenseless body through the instance of pure exposure and vulnerability. Similarly, Laruelle’s “the lived” is called le joui, regardless of whether it is the product of the infliction of pain or pleasure. “It is the undivided (of) pain—yet not determined by it—as the undivided lived of joy, but never their synthesis, not even immanent.” (Laruelle, Theorie des Etrangers, 225)   The unilateral, mute instance of the lived in Marx’s text is called suffering, regardless of whether it is the result of violence or a sensation of pleasure. 

[...] the object is the manifestation of the human reality, [...] it is human activity and human suffering, for suffering, humanly considered, is a kind of self-enjoyment of man. [Marx, “Third Manuscript,” in Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844.]

Suffering is self-enjoyment, not because of some vague masochistic inclination, but because it represents a surpassed alienation. Pain situates us in the real of ourselves. The real is the instance one inhabits prior to any “making sense out of it”—in anteriority vis-à-vis language—it precedes any possibility of abstraction (including that of “abstract activity and a belly”).  Laruelle’s “joui sans jouissance” is one of the “first names” of the real that we all are in the last instance. [Laruelle, Théorie des Etrangers, 222] It is the enjoyed, without the idea of “enjoyment,” without conceptualization or a philosophy of enjoyment, without attaching it any sort of value.

From Katerina Kolozova's Toward A Radical Metaphysics of Socialism, p 15-16.